

Trials of Nation Making

Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810–1910

Brooke Larson

Stony Brook University



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Introduction

This book is a much expanded and revised version of an essay originally published in the *Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas: South America* (edited by F. Salomon and S. Schwartz [Cambridge, 1999], III: 2, 558–703), which is part of a multi-volume study of indigenous histories and cultures throughout this hemisphere from ancient times to the present day. My original assignment was to write about indigenous responses to independence and liberal reforms throughout South America’s western highlands, interior jungles, and southern pampas. Notwithstanding my editors’ confidence in me, I immediately recognized my own limitations of time and expertise and convinced them to “carve up” South American ethnic territories, leaving me with the broad swath of territory that once formed the core regions of the Inca empire. My colleagues Jonathan Hill and Kristine Jones brought, respectively, their own talents and expertise to the Amazon lowlands and the Araucanian plains of the far south.¹ By contrast, this study focuses

¹ See Jonathan Hill, “Indigenous Peoples and the Rise of Independent Nation-States in Lowland South America,” and Kristine Jones, “Warfare, Reorganization, and Readaptation at the Margins of Spanish Rule: the Southern

specifically on native peoples of the Andean highlands, stretching from the Chibcha peoples of northern Colombia to the Quechua and Aymara communities of southern Bolivia. Most were peasants who lived in sedentary villages or on Spanish estates, where they eked out a living from agriculture and herding. Many peasants also engaged in a variety of other subsistent activities, including barter and trade, pack driving, textile spinning and weaving, and day wage labor. Since highland peasants had lived under centralized states since before the Spanish conquest, they continued to provide a significant portion of their surplus labor or crops in the form of tribute and other obligations to their political overlords. These native peasantries, however remote or unchanged they might have seemed to nineteenth-century European travelers, were the bearers of a culture and social organization so transformed by conquest, colonialism, and later the violent transition to republican rule that “the depth of change still challenges the historiographic imagination.”² With such a statement, the late Thierry Saignes advances an implicit challenge to historians to contemplate the depth of social and cultural change in the Andes, set in motion by European currents. To some extent, this book takes up that challenge by exploring the history of rural highland Andean people swept into the vortex of modernizing global, national, or regional economies and who, one way or another, “engaged their wider political world.”³

Margins (1573–1882),” in F. Salomon and S. Schwartz, eds., *Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas: South America* (Cambridge, 1999), III: 2, 704–64 and 138–87, respectively.

² Thierry Saignes, “The Colonial Condition in the Quechua-Aymara Heartland (1570–1780),” in F. Salomon and S. Schwartz, eds., *Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas: South America* (Cambridge, 1999), III: 2, 59–137, quotation on 59.

³ The phrase comes from Steve Stern’s edited collection on peasant politics and political cultures in the Andes, *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries* (Madison, 1987), 5–6.

But why confine the chronological scope to the nineteenth century? Social and economic historians have long been interested in tracing continuities across the conventional political divide between colony and republic. Some have reorganized historical time around the idea of the “long nineteenth century,” stretching from the latter part of the eighteenth century to well into the early twentieth century, say from 1780 to 1930. Their “long nineteenth century” has the advantage of encompassing cultural continuities and structural constraints that shaped postcolonial history. Certainly this time frame accommodated anthropologists’ interest in the extraordinary resilience of Andean cultural practices. But as Saignes warned, too much emphasis on issues of “cultural survival” tends to reify the singularity of Andean political culture in its mountainous environment while removing it from messy historical contexts of flux and change.⁴ Recent theoretical problems of “postcolonialism,” emanating from cultural theorists interested in the endurance of colonial hierarchies, knowledges, and representations in African and Asian societies emerging from long histories of formal colonialism under the West, have pointed to the continuity and contestation of colonial polarities in the process of forging modern nationhood.⁵

⁴ The conceptual struggle to balance cultural continuities against historical forces of change in long-term studies of native Andean societies has been a vital source of interdisciplinary conversation and debate among Andeanists since the 1970s. For a synthesis of that debate, see Brooke Larson, “Andean Communities, Political Cultures, and Markets: the Changing Contours of a Field,” in Brooke Larson and Olivia Harris with E. Tandeter, eds., *Ethnicity, Markets and Migration in the Andes: At the Crossroads of History and Anthropology* (Durham, 1995), 5–53, and various contributions in Segundo Moreno Yáñez and Frank Salomon, eds., *Reproducción y transformación en las sociedades andinas, siglos XVI–XX* (Quito, 1991), 2 vols.

⁵ See the influential volume edited by Gyan Prakash, *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements* (Princeton, 1995). *Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths, and H. Tiffin, eds. (London, 1995) reveals the breadth and variety of “postcolonial” topics,

Among Latin American scholars, a renewed interest in the question of “the colonial legacy” has provoked a broader conceptual argument about the “problem of persistence” in Latin American history.⁶ As Jeremy Adelman notes, too much emphasis on the deep structures and discourses of colonialism leaves out of the picture the power of people, and especially subaltern groups, to alter the course of nation making.

Perhaps more than almost anywhere else in the Americas, Andean peasant history has taught us differently. For even after interminable centuries of colonial rule, it was the Andean peasantries of highland Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia who rose up against symbols of colonial oppression and brought the emerging transatlantic “Age of Revolution” into the interior of South America. Comparable to the slave-led upheavals of Haiti in the 1790s, Andean peasant insurgency in the 1770s and 1780s forever changed the configuration of colonial power, at the top, and local

approaches, and concerns, all of which are loosely bound by their critical approaches to questions of power, meaning, and culture in societies where modernity encounters imperialism, or internal colonialism. Subaltern studies, an offshoot of postcolonial theory, shifts the locus of analysis to peasant and other “subaltern” groups as subjects of history in counter-hegemonic narratives. See the recent critical appraisal by Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies* (2002). Postcolonial and subaltern questions are creatively engaged in the Andean context by Silva Rivera, “La raíz: colonizadores y colonizados,” in Xavier Albó and Raúl Barrios, eds., *Violencias encubiertas en Bolivia. Cultura y Política* (La Paz, 1993), 27–142, and Mark Thurner, *From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Postcolonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru* (Durham, 1997).

⁶ Jeremy Adelman, ed., *Colonial Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History* (New York, 1999). I implicitly refer to the older “structural” analyses of colonial heritages, legacies, and continuities in the larger context of Latin America’s position of “economic dependence” in the world economy. For example, the flagship study of Stanley and Barbara Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective* (New York, 1970).

indigenous polities and forms of ethnic mediation, at the bottom of society. At the level of the state, the Bourbon reforms, and a particularly harsh persecution of all things Inca, were tangible outcomes of the Andean rebellions. Equally significant was the bitter impact of that historical period for indigenous people. Collective peasant memories of rebellion and repression, although discontinuous and latent for much of the nineteenth century, lay buried just under the surface of quotidian consciousness until well into the twentieth century. In moments of political crisis and rupture, local indigenous peoples might tap into those long-term historical memories, or they might conjure Inca or Andean utopias, as armament in local struggles for land and justice. On this conceptual level, therefore, there is no logical case to be made for severing deep genealogies of Andean communal memory and struggle or, for that matter, for dichotomizing Andean political history into the familiar time units of colonial and republican. Indeed, this book will have occasion to reach back into late colonial history, and particularly to that historical juncture of crisis and transformation in the late eighteenth-century Andean highlands, in order to understand developments in the period after independence. Yet that late colonial “Age of Andean Insurrection” is itself a critical historical moment that needs to be set apart from national narratives and examined in its own right. Indeed, it was thought that the “Age of Andean Insurrection” was significant enough to warrant its own extended treatment in the Cambridge volumes,⁷ and there is a flourishing new historical subfield reappraising that era of upheaval (see the Bibliographic Essay).

This book approaches the history of highland Andean peoples as fundamentally intertwined with a larger set of economic, political, social, and cultural processes, not as a set of inert peasant

⁷ See Luís Miguel Glave, “The ‘Republic of Indians’ in Revolt, c. 1680–1790,” in F. Salomon and S. Schwartz, eds., *Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas: South America* (Cambridge, 1999), 3 vols., III: 2, 502–57.

communities or cultures to which world-historical forces suddenly arrived. Contrary to nationalist renderings of the independence wars along the Pacific seaboard of South America, my premise is that popular and peasant uprisings fundamentally conditioned the undulating movement of revolution and counterrevolution during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, making the would-be Creole patriots ever more ambivalent about the prospects and promises of independence. Thus, as many historians have argued, it seems that the wars for independence followed a contrapuntal logic – to rupture colonial rule without unleashing another “age of insurrection” in the interior peasant highlands. Where that perilous project could not be secured, Creole elites often preferred to forgo independence altogether. In the greater Andean region, the political destiny of the colonies seemed to hang in the balance for a quarter of a century. Even after formal independence came, the fear of bandit hordes, no less than full-scale Indian rebellion, cast deep shadows across Creole political ambitions for the rest of the nineteenth century.

Like much of the rest of Spanish America in the aftermath of war, the Andean republics succumbed to other threats, more structural in nature – economic recession, political instability, elite fragmentation, militarized haciendas, and deep regional rivalry. On the other hand, the chaos of war and economic retrenchment did not shatter colonial forms of power and extraction in the countryside, nor even mark the end of the colonial institution of Indian tribute. Bolivarian ambitions and rhetoric aside, three insolvent republics promptly reverted to the Indian head tax, levied primarily on land-based *ayllus*, or indigenous communities. Creole statesmen only began to dismantle their nations’ tributary regimes under the converging material and ideological pressures (and opportunities for new revenue sources) emanating from export-driven capitalism after 1850. State reforms to end tribute at midcentury thus created a crucial material and symbolic turning point, as Creole

politicians began to prepare their republics for (what they hoped would be) the onset of liberalism, capitalism, and modern state making.

Although liberal political leaders heralded the abolition of African slavery and Indian tribute as the triumph of modernity over the colonial past, indigenous peasant leaders took a more cautious, ambivalent stance. However hated, abused, and onerous the institution of tribute, it had imparted traditional colonial rights and obligations to native peoples by virtue of their status of “Indian” vassal under the protective laws of Spanish absolutism. Abolition of tribute under modernizing republics may have lifted the onerous head tax (although it was rapidly reimposed under new guises), but it also removed the formal right of indigenous people to claim communal lands, local self-rule, and state protection. In the eyes of modernizing elites, this particular colonial heritage (i.e., inherited colonial-Andean rights to communal land access) stood in the way of economic progress, particularly in the South Andes where traditional communities still held on to large swaths of highland. In accord with liberal and capitalist precepts, Indian land and labor needed to be converted into transferable commodities, whose redistribution would be mediated by the play of market forces and secured by individual property rights. The abolition of communal landholding was no mere theoretical threat, for by 1870 powerful world-historical forces did begin to pose massive threats of land divestiture and labor extraction to highland communities. In many parts of the Andean highlands, liberalism and modernity seemed to unleash a new cycle of territorial and cultural conquest, which set in motion a series of intense conflicts between peasant groups, regional overlords, and the centralizing modernizing state. At a deeper level, these converging pressures of modernity created *an arena of interpretive struggle* over indigenous political rights, social memory, location, and identity, which reflected the postcolonial predicament of so many native Andean peasants caught between the contradictory

legal-political discourses of colonialism, liberalism, and racism. My aim in this book is to trace the layered contours of struggle, adaptation, and contestation among highland Andean peasants that lay at the very core of nation-building processes in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.

Before we set off on this journey, we might rightfully ask ourselves why we should conjoin the ideas of liberalism, racism, and ethnicity? After all, independence ruptured the old imperial order and opened up the possibility of creating societies built on all-encompassing constitutions and ideals of individual equality before the law. The short answer to this question is to suggest that such political possibilities engendered deeper anxieties and unresolved tensions inherent in the generic postcolonial situation, but especially in places where colonialism, slavery, and caste had been deeply entrenched for several centuries. In regions like Mexico, the Caribbean, or the Andes, the institutional and normative apparatus of coerced labor would not soon be dismantled. And as Paul Gilroy has so beautifully studied, the institutions of labor coercion, colonialism, and racism gave those subordinated people who experienced them a vantage point on Western modernity that starkly exposed the limits and contradictions of universalist and nationalist ideals. Both the Caribbean and the Andes, and other regions where internal cultures of colonialism prevailed, thus became “critical transformative sites[s] of that modernity,” not the least because of the ambiguous encounter of African and Andean populations with it.⁸ By anchoring these four historical cases of postcolonial Andean republics deep in the subsoil of colonial heritages,

⁸ Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, 1993); see also Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in their edited volume, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997), 1–56, quotation on 8.

fractious states, and subaltern subjectivities, this book offers a corrective counterpoint, perhaps, to an earlier tendency in the historical literature to grant too much agency to the power of the “hegemonizing” state to bind subordinated popular cultures to the dominant state through discursive and institutional means in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By bringing popular culture and state formation into a tense relational “field of force,” the late Bill Roseberry suggested that we think about “cultural hegemony” as a multilayered process through which dominant and subordinated groups argued over the terms of power and justice within a “common discursive framework.”⁹ Like many recent interpreters of Gramsci’s notions of power, culture, and social practice, Roseberry envisions hegemony not as a static state of consent, but rather as a lived “language of contention” through which subaltern classes actively challenged dominant discourses, symbols, and state institutions. It is this analytical framework, highlighting mediations between power and meaning, social practice and state formation, that has guided historical work on the theme of nation making in post-colonial Latin America in recent years.¹⁰

⁹ William Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention,” in Gilbert Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., *Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico* (Durham, 1994), 355–66.

¹⁰ To sample this approach to the problem of cultural hegemony in Latin America, there is no better example than Joseph and Nugent’s 1994 volume, *Everyday Forms of State Making*, although the historical literature is voluminous by now. Much of this historical literature borrows its conceptual starting point from cultural Marxism, including the applied re-readings of Antonio Gramsci’s *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (London, 1971) by such non-Latin Americanist scholars as Stuart Hall, Raymond Williams, James Scott, Philip Corrigan, and Derek Sayer. See especially Kate Crehan’s clear and insightful study of how Gramscian notions of culture and power have informed recent anthropological studies, *Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology* (Berkeley, 2002).

Early-twentieth-century Mexico has provided an especially salient case for exploring the hegemonic capacity of postrevolutionary “mestizo nationalism” to absorb and deploy indigenous and popular politics in a common framework of meaning, albeit in a singularly fluid political and social context. But the framework also lends itself to broad comparative studies of “everyday forms of state formation” and the sort of societies, polities, and political cultures those tense hegemonic processes eventually produced. Florencia Mallon’s searching comparison of peasant struggles over land, power, and meaning in Mexico and Peru immediately comes to mind.¹¹ Analyzing the interactions of alternative discourses of liberalism and justice in comparable contexts of state formation, peasant land divestiture, and foreign invasion, Mallon argued that in certain instances the liberalizing Mexican state was forced to come to terms with radical peasant projects and to partially incorporate them into nationalist discourses in order to tame, or submerge, them during the mid- to late nineteenth century. She then uses the Mexican template to draw comparative insights from the Andean case of republican Peru, arguing that colonial legacies, civil war, and rural rebellion ended up producing a highly authoritarian, profoundly racist, and exclusionary political culture in Peru. Just as Gramsci used the idea of hegemony to explain the *failure* of the Piedmont bourgeoisie to construct a common language of rule, so Mallon explores the incapacity of Peruvian politicians and intellectuals to broaden notions of national belonging in the late nineteenth century. Rather, the Peruvian state constructed a “new system of neocolonial domination, . . . built once again on the principles of an ethnic and spatial policy of divide and rule.”¹²

¹¹ Florencia Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley, 1995).

¹² *Ibid.*, 328.

By most measures, both comparative and historical, it seems apparent that the Andean republics had uncommon difficulty negotiating power and legitimacy within a common framework of liberalism or nationalism during the late nineteenth century. Neither the turn away from colonial-tributary traditions to liberal free-trade doctrines around midcentury, nor the emergence of “civilizing” discourses at the end of the nineteenth century, succeeded in binding indigenous cultural values or identities to the discursive domain of the nation-state in the greater Andean region. To argue the contrary viewpoint is to grant too much agency to liberal or republican discourses and their putative capacity to rupture internal colonialism or to contain contestatory Andean cultures and identities. On this last point, we must take particular care in the Andean region because, as Mark Thurner has shown for the case of Huaylas, Peru, both Andean Creole elites and indigenous peasantries engaged in a discursive mirror-game of ambivalent *republicanismo*, which reflected its radical polyvalence. Urban elites and peasant communities inscribed varied political meanings and moral expectations in that word – as they tried to negotiate postcolonial arrangements that would govern Indian-state relations.¹³ On the other hand, such ambiguities of meaning opened up all sorts of possibilities for local forms of negotiation and maneuver under the right circumstances. The general condition of statelessness in the Andean countryside following the wars of independence, and the official restoration of Indian tribute (often thinly veiled by universalistic euphemisms), went a long way toward postponing the rupture of Indian-state dialogues and local understandings of *republicanismo*. By midcentury, however, liberalizing states began to discard the juridical remnants of the colonial “dual republic” in their halting efforts to bring all Indian subjects under one unifying rule of law. As mentioned earlier, this turn toward liberal discourse

¹³ Thurner, *From Two Republics to One Divided*, chap. 2.

had blunt material roots, as world market conditions opened up channels of commercial and industrial capitalism. In the rural hinterlands, liberal policy involved the redrawing of lines on a map, the redefinition and allocation of land ownership, and the conversion of communal forms of landed possession to individual property. All across Amerindian regions, the advent of liberal reforms intensified the ongoing competition for legitimacy, not just for the right to claim contested lands but also for the right to define the political rules of the game in the first place. Popular readings of *republicanismo*, particularly as they pertained to colonial entitlements to communal lands and lifeways, gradually lost ground to metropolitan discourses of liberalism, racism, and civilization.

But it would be a mistake to reduce peasant politics to the proverbial polarity of Indian resistance or accommodation to the forces of liberal reform during the mid- to late nineteenth century. To do so would be to deduce peasant political subjectivity simply from class determinants or, even more speciously, from putative cultural attributes. The four Andean case studies in this book reveal the dynamic, unpredictable interplay between social contexts and subaltern subjectivities, between individual and communal agendas, between momentary configurations of power and possibilities of social action. Clearly, the advent of “popular liberalism” among certain groups of peasants at key political moments did not necessarily signify Indian endorsement of free-trade doctrines, the sovereignty of the individual, propertied citizenship, or assimilation through *mestizaje* (i.e., race mixing). In the same way, native Andeanness did not preclude local *intracommunal* forms of struggle and conflict, individual opportunism, or the plasticity of ethnic self-identity. Market and export resurgence in the late nineteenth century did open up new spaces for individual smallholding, migration, and social mobility through *mestizaje* toward the end of the nineteenth century, and many peasants followed those routes out of their condition of rural Indianness into the ambiguous racial-spatial domain of urban underclass life.

Nor, on the other hand, did indigenous people make reflexive use of the colonial law and discourse (the Hapsburg legal construct of the “*república de indios*”) in order to advocate the wholesale restoration of colonial rule – complete with its regulatory institutions of extraction, social control, and hierarchy. But in those regions where indigenous material experience, social connections, and political understandings were largely defined by the *ayllu*-community, there often ensued a dangerous disjuncture between the political aspirations of liberalizing elites and the moral expectations of native Andean leaders. And with the breakdown of a common language of contention, state reform could easily turn into threat, peasant grievance into violence, local conflicts into “ethnic mobilization,” and elite anxiety into military repression. So it was that the Andes entered the twentieth century without having built a hegemonic “language of contention” to replace the shattered colonial heritage of “dual republics” or to contain the resurgence of ethnic politics.

Fundamental to the failure of the Andean republics to negotiate cultural hegemony was the profound ambivalence that fissured the dreams and discourses of Creole nation-builders themselves. Post-colonial theory has gone a long way toward exposing the dialectics of inclusion and exclusion that lay at the very core of cultural nationalism and Western modernity in a variety of contexts. For the central paradox of Western modernity was to impose universal definitions of free labor and citizenship, as well as to mold national cultures into homogeneous wholes (along Eurocentric ideals), while creating the symbols and categories of innate difference in order to set the limits on those “universalistic” ideals.¹⁴ In citing Ben Anderson’s felicitous metaphor of cultural nationalism as imagined

¹⁴ Etienne Balibar, “The Paradoxes of Universality,” in David Goldberg, ed., *Anatomy of Racism* (Minneapolis, 1990), 283–294; and Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, 1993).

community, we must pay equal attention to the ways in which Andean Creole elites (re)produced, or reconfigured, the enduring structures of colonial class and racial domination.¹⁵ A major task of this book is to consider the production of racialized values, images, and discourses normalizing new colonial-racial hierarchies designed to fill the vacuum left by the old tributary/caste system.¹⁶ Creole nation-builders did so, however, not by producing a dense and coherent canon of scientific doctrines or *indigenista* literatures. Positivist ideologies burst onto the national scene in the late 1880s and 1890s, but with a few pioneering exceptions, *indigenista* writers did not gain national influence until well into the early twentieth century. Even so, it is important to examine emerging elite articulations of liberalism, nationalism, and racism in messy political contexts of rural struggle, market expansion, and political crisis. This study seeks to do so by exploring how nineteenth-century racial imagery, thinking, and practice were embedded in, and in turn reorganized, internal colonial hierarchies subordinating Indianness (and its variant racial admixtures) to the Creole domain of power, civilization, and citizenship. Just as colonial ideology and law once codified a tripartite hierarchy on the basis of racial purity and mixture (white, mestizo, Indian), so now did modern race thinking reinforce biocultural and spatial distinctions designed to locate Indians, and hybrid

¹⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1991), esp. chaps. 6 and 8.

¹⁶ In thinking about the intersection of racial representation, liberal ideology, and/or the development of nationalism in the west, I have drawn on numerous conceptual and historical studies, many of which are cited later. But see especially, David Goldberg, *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning* (Oxford, 1993); Etienne Balibar and I. Wallerstein, *Race, Nation Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London, 1991); and Michael Omi and H. Winant, *Racial Formation in the USA from the 1960s to the 1980s* (New York, 1986). For synoptic discussions of “racial and ethnic” relations and discourses in Latin America, I often have relied on Peter Wade’s synthesis, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America* (London, 1997).

popular cultures, on the boundaries of national belonging. The quandary for Andean Creole elites was precisely how to build an apparatus of power that simultaneously incorporated and marginalized peasant political cultures in the forced march to modernity.

The book brings closure to these overlapping national narratives of Indians and nations around 1910, perhaps as arbitrary a cut-off point as any other year might seem to be. Certainly, there is no obvious benchmark, since the Andes experienced no convulsive event approaching the 1910 Mexican Revolution. But as I hope to illustrate, the converging pressures of modernization and modernity (the latter refers broadly to discursive struggles over the idea of a universal modernizing process) profoundly redefined the ideological climate, brute power relations, agrarian conditions, and Andean identities vis-à-vis emerging nation-states in ways that endured well into the twentieth century. Retrospectively, it is possible to calibrate the myriad material and ideological changes that came about in the transition from tribute-based Andean republics to racially polarized nation-states over the second half of the nineteenth century. And yet if we project ahead in time to the 1920s and 1930s, it is also possible to appreciate the advent of new forms of peasant, labor, and populist politics; the rise of nationalist and populist state projects, armed with rural outreach programs of educational, hygienic, and moral reform; and, not least, the economic and political consequences of the tectonic shifts in world market capitalism after 1930. The study of Andean indigenous history and politics during the first half of the twentieth century necessarily becomes more involved in broader national and transnational processes, as Bolivian anthropologist, Xavier Albó, has so insightfully demonstrated.¹⁷

¹⁷ See his essay, "Andean People in the Twentieth Century," in F. Salomon and S. Schwartz, eds., *Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas: South America*, III: 2, 765–871.